Freedom as Satisfaction? A Critique of Frankfurt's Hierarchical Theory of Freedom

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Christian F. Rostbøll]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2004
Enthalten in:
SATS, 5/1(2004-05), 131-146
Format:
Artikel (online)
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100 1 |a Rostbøll  |D Christian F.  |u Department of Political Science, Columbia University. cfr4@columbia.edu 
245 1 0 |a Freedom as Satisfaction? A Critique of Frankfurt's Hierarchical Theory of Freedom  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Christian F. Rostbøll] 
520 3 |a This article is a critical assessment of Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of freedom. It spells out and distinguishes several different and irreconcilable conceptions of freedom present in Frankfurt's work. I argue that Frankfurt is ambiguous in his early formulation as to what conception of freedom of the will the hierarchical theory builds on, an avoidability or a satisfaction conception. This ambiguity causes problems in his later attempts to respond to the objections of wantonness of second-order desires and of infinite regress. With his more recent idea of freedom as being satisfied with harmony in one's entire volitional system, Frankfurt may solve the infinite regress objection but he does so at the cost of ending up with a description of freedom, which comes very close to being identical to his own description of the wanton. Frankfurt's account leaves open the question of whether the satisfactory harmony is caused by the inability to do otherwise, or is independent of it. To answer this question, Frankfurt's hierarchical theory needs to be complemented with a number of "autonomy variables” (Double). Satisfaction may be a necessary condition of freedom, but it is not sufficient. We also need to know how the person came to be satisfied. If being satisfied is merely something that happens to one, it fails to be an adequate description of a free person - and it also contradicts some of Frankfurt's own earlier insights. 
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