The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Eric Ip]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/3(2015-09-01), 307-327
Format:
Artikel (online)
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10602-015-9187-1  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Ip  |D Eric  |u Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Eric Ip] 
520 3 |a The constitutional foundations of economic liberty in Hong Kong, the freest economy in the world according to many, are little understood. So as the perceived spread of collusion, cronyism, and corruption in the territory ever since the 1997 transfer of sovereignty despite China's promises that little change will be made to the pre-existing way of life. Relying on the analytical tools of constitutional economics, this article argues that the Beijing-ratified Hong Kong Basic Law preserved only the form of the territory's original, British-descended, constitution, not the substance; as witness the insertion of contradictory interventionist mandates, and the consequent reversal of principal-agent relationship of government to the business elite. The erosion of economic freedom over the past 17years is explicable, at least partly, by the entry into force of the Basic Law, which has transformed the Hong Kong state from the impartial and passive umpire it once was into a partisan social engineer and economic gamesman, thereby unleashing skyrocketing rent-seeking opportunities. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 
690 7 |a Economic liberty  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Rent-seeking  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Constitutional design  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Hong Kong  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 307-327  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<307  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Ip  |D Eric  |u Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 307-327  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<307  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602