Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Shruti Rajagopalan]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Constitutional Political Economy, 26/3(2015-09-01), 328-355
Format:
Artikel (online)
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100 1 |a Rajagopalan  |D Shruti  |u Department of Economics, Purchase College, State University of New York, 10577, Purchase, NY, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Shruti Rajagopalan] 
520 3 |a There has been a decline in rule of law in India, reflected in the frequent amendments to the Indian Constitution. This paper analyzes the historical, ideological, and economic context for constitutional amendments to understand the reason for the deterioration of constitutionalism in India. I argue that the formal institutions of socialist planning were fundamentally incompatible with the constraints imposed by the Indian Constitution. This incompatibility led to frequent amendments to the Constitution, especially in the area of Fundamental Rights. Consequently, pursuitof socialist policies gradually undermined the Constitution. The contradictory mixture of socialism and constitutionalism led to economic and political deprivations that were never intended by the framers. I demonstrate this incompatibility using evidence from five-year-plans and constitutional amendments in India. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 
690 7 |a Indian Constitution  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Property rights  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Constitutional amendments  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Socialist planning  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Rule of law  |2 nationallicence 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Rajagopalan  |D Shruti  |u Department of Economics, Purchase College, State University of New York, 10577, Purchase, NY, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Constitutional Political Economy  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 26/3(2015-09-01), 328-355  |x 1043-4062  |q 26:3<328  |1 2015  |2 26  |o 10602