EU Merger Control: A Set of Proposals to Enhance the Operational Effectiveness of the Current Architecture of Separate Jurisdictional Zones

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Leigh Davison]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Liverpool Law Review, 36/1(2015-04-01), 33-48
Format:
Artikel (online)
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10991-015-9161-z  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Davison  |D Leigh  |u Hull University Business School, University of Hull, Hull, UK  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a EU Merger Control: A Set of Proposals to Enhance the Operational Effectiveness of the Current Architecture of Separate Jurisdictional Zones  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Leigh Davison] 
520 3 |a The paper documents the failure of the EU's current merger control architecture to address the misallocation problem and proposes changes to the architecture which would virtually eliminate this major concern. This will streamline the working of the architecture by removing the need for correctives to either prevent misallocation or reassign cases that have been misallocated. Moreover, and just as importantly, the resolution of this problem will improve the application of the principle of subsidiarity in merger cases and bring to an end the multiple notification issue, thereby strengthening the operation of the one-stop shop approach. The changes to the architecture and how they interact to virtually end the misallocation problem and thereby bring about the aforementioned benefits are revealed. More specifically, it demonstrates how the use of the three or more Member state notification rule and the distinct market test, the retention of the existing two Community Dimension tests and the two-thirds rule, as well as the shared competence of the Competition Directorate and Member state regulators to apply EU merger law, albeit intentionally in different situations, reinforce each other to resolve the stated problem. Moreover, this limited sharing of the right to apply EU merger law—currently the EU Commission has the exclusive right—allied with other forms of envisaged cooperation between the regulators is not just simply a reinterpretation of the Commission's most appropriate authority goal but also the possible beginnings of a more cooperative architecture, relative to the current architecture of separate jurisdictional zones, aimed at improving the efficacy and efficiency of merger control within the Union. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2015 
690 7 |a EU merger control  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Architecture of separate jurisdictional zones  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Misallocation problem  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Multiple notification issue  |2 nationallicence 
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